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1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between governmental regula- 
tions and small and micro enterprises is the subject of 
increasing interest and concern in developing coun- 
tries. Governments, for example, are grappling with 
ways to encourage the growth of such enterprises 
while, at the same time, desiring to regulate their 
activities and expand the tax base. Which of the many 
regulations influencing small and micro enterprises 
will help governments achieve these goals? Are there 
tradeoffs between these goals? This paper focuses on 
the decision by entrepreneurs whether to register with 
the government. Among the several important issues 
that we address are how many of these firms, in fact, 
are actually registered and what are prime determi- 
nants of the extent of this registration. Does the mag- 
nitude of this registration vary significantly by coun- 
try, sector, location and other key variables? 
This paper examines the determinants of small and 
microenterprise registration in two African countries, 
Niger and Swaziland, using a logit framework. Niger 
was chosen because it is reported to have a relatively 
onerous legal and regulatory environment, while 
Swaziland is reputed to have an environment much 
more supportive of small and micro enterprises.’ In 
both countries, detailed surveys were recently con- 
ducted of small and micro enterprises ranging in size 
from one to 50 workers operating in five sectors: gar- 
ment, wood, and metal manufacturing along with gar- 
ment and food retailing (Joumard, Liedholm and 
Mead, 1992). 
The descriptive findings concerning registration in 
these two countries will be summarized in Section 2. 
In Section 3, the reasons governments require regis- 
tration are explored. Section 4 presents a brief theoret- 
ical discussion of the determinants of registration 
from the perspective of the enterprise. This is fol- 
lowed by a review of the relevant independent vari- 
ables and an elaboration of the logit regression 
method that will be used to analyze the data. The find- 
ings are then presented and discussed. Section 8 pre- 
sents concluding remarks. 
*The collection of the data used in this research was sup- 
ported by the OECD and USAID’s Growth and Equity 
Through Microenterprise Investments and Institutions 
(GEMINI) Project. The authors gratefully acknowledge the 
useful comments and suggestions of Donald Mead. Final 
revision accepted: August 1, 1995. 
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2. SURVEY FINDINGS 
One of the key survey findings is the divergence 
between the legal requirements of registration and the 
actual registration of firms. In both Niger and 
Swaziland, virtually all nonfarrn enterprises engaged 
in economic activity are required to be registered with 
some unit of the government (see Joumard, Liedholm, 
and Mead, 1992 for details). Yet, the surveys revealed 
that sizeable numbers are not, in fact, registered. In 
Niger, for example, only 72% of the firms in urban 
areas and 8% of the firms in rural areas (villages) were 
registered; in Swaziland, only 58% of urban firms and 
4% of the rural (village) firms were registered. Thus, 
substantial numbers of small and microenterprises in 
both countries were not registered as required by law. 
Another important finding is that the extent of reg- 
istration varies by several discernible characteristics 
of these enterprises. In addition to the locational fac- 
tors mentioned previously, there is evidence that reg- 
istration varies directly with the size of the firm. In 
Swaziland, for example, only 36% of the one-person 
firms were registered, while 80% of enterprises with 
two or more workers were registered. There were also 
wide differences by sector. In Swaziland, for example, 
the percentage of firms registered varied from 20% in 
wood manufacturing to over 80% in clothes retailing. 
What reasons were given by the enterprises for not 
registering their businesses? In both Niger and 
Swaziland, over 50% of the nonregistered entrepre- 
neurs claimed either that registration was not required 
or did not know registration was required. Less than 
20% wished to obtain a license but found the proce- 
dures too complicated or too costly. Thus, it would 
seem that lack of information rather than high cost 
was the prime stated reason for the lack of registration. 
Although entrepreneurs were not directly asked 
whether not having a license was a problem, Joumard, 
Liedholm, and Mead (1992) report indirect evidence 
that for the most part, lack of registration did not cause 
these firms any undue difficulties. Furthermore, the 
authors present evidence from a statistical analysis of 
the relationship between firm registration and firm 
growth. Controlling for other factors such as firm size 
and location, the sector in which it operates, and char- 
acteristics of the entrepreneur, they find that there is 
no significant relationship between whether a firm is 
registered and its growth prospects. 
Was registration an onerous process, involving 
high transactions costs for the business? De Soto 
(1986), for example, has argued that these costs are 
very high in Peru and has reported that it takes 43 days 
to obtain official approval to set up a small store, and 
289 days to set up a small factory there. In Ecuador, 
registration in the industrial sector takes between 180 
and 240 days (Klein and Tokman, 1993). Markedly 
different results were found, however, in Swaziland 
and Niger. The surveys in these countries asked those 
who had registered how long they had waited from the 
time of their application until registration was com- 
pleted. Of those currently registered in Swaziland, the 
average waiting period was 2.2 months. For more than 
one-half, the waiting time was one month or less. A 
follow-up question asked how much time they had to 
spend personally in following the registration proce- 
dures. The average figure in Swaziland was 2.3 hours. 
In Niger, the time was even less because unlike 
Swaziland, the authorities actually visited the firm. 
It must be recognized that registration decision is 
only one of many interrelated decisions. Should an 
enterprise comply with minimum-wage laws? Should 
it pay the required taxes. While we do not consider 
these important issues directly, it seems reasonable 
that a firm deciding to comply with registration 
requirements is more likely to comply with other reg- 
ulations. Additionally, Joumard, Liedholm and Mead 
(1992, pp. 53-59) present evidence that the factors 
influencing a proprietor’s decisions regarding compli- 
ance with registration requirements, tax laws, labor 
regulations and other laws are largely the same. Thus, 
concentrating on the registration decision may shed 
light on a continuum of related issues. 
In summary, the descriptive findings from the sur- 
veys in the two countries indicated that sizeable num- 
bers of enterprises were not registered; nevertheless, 
obtaining a license, for the most part, was relatively 
easy for those who had it, while the lack of license did 
not appear to be a serious constraint for most of those 
who did not have one. 
3. WHY DO GOVERNMENTS REQUIRE 
REGISTRATION?Z 
In both Niger and Swaziland, almost all enterprises 
are required by the central government to register.3 
From the perspective of each central government, reg- 
istration is mandatory for several reasons. First, regis- 
tration permits tax revenue to be collected from busi- 
nesses. In Swaziland, a tax on business income applies 
to almost all registered enterprises.4 Should the enter- 
prise in question not keep records (as is the case for 
most small and micro enterprises), the tax assessor is 
charged with estimating the income of the business. In 
addition, other taxes are collected for the Swazi gov- 
ernment by the enterprise. Examples include a poll tax 
and a sales tax. In Niger, registered businesses pay the 
patente (business license tax) and may also pay other 
taxes, including taxes on rental income, commercial 
signs, and profits. 
A second reason central governments require reg- 
istration is so that certain labor regulations can more 
easily be enforced. Both countries have minimum 
wage laws, as well as regulations regarding holidays. 
In addition, Swaziland has laws regulating the use of 
child and female labor.5 
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Along the same lines, central governments may 
require registration so that they can better enforce cer- 
tain other regulations deemed important for the com- 
mon good. For example, in both Swaziland and Niger, 
businesses involving the processing or handling of 
foods and beverages are subject to a variety of health 
and sanitation regulations. Were registration not 
mandatory, the enforcement of such laws would be 
difficult. 
Although it is the central government that purports 
to enforce registration, in both countries the local 
authorities also have a significant interest in the 
process. In Swaziland, any proposed small or micro 
enterprise on Swazi Nation Land6 must first meet with 
the approval of the local chief before the application is 
forwarded to the Swazi Commercial Amadota (SCA), 
i.e., the regional representative of the king. In addition 
to being able to exert control on the number and type 
of businesses in his locale, the chief may also be remu- 
nerated in other ways. Generally, the chief assigns at 
least two representatives to accompany the prospec- 
tive entrepreneur to the meeting with the SCA, and all 
of their expenses are paid by the applicant. 
In Niger, the benefits to the local governments of 
registering firms are more direct. Although it is 
employees of the national government who collect the 
parente revenue, these revenues are turned over to the 
local governments. Approximately one-third of the 
local governments’ budgets come from this source. 
4. THE REGISTRATION DECISION 
Clearly, local and national governments in both 
countries are interested in registering practically all 
small enterprises. Our survey results also indicate that 
the registration process is not especially onerous. 
Nevertheless, as noted in the previous section, most 
small enterprises in both countries do not register. It is 
the decision by the proprietor as to whether to register 
to which we now turn. 
What influences a proprietor’s choice regarding 
registering her business with the authorities? As noted 
previously, many proprietors are unaware even that 
registration is required. These entrepreneurs fail to 
register out of ignorance, not conscious choice. The 
degree to which information about registration filters 
down to individual entrepreneurs depends both on the 
ability of individual proprietors to understand what 
information is available, and on the efforts of the gov- 
ernment to ensure that information reaches business- 
persons. 
For those proprietors who have access to informa- 
tion regarding registration, one might hypothesize that 
this decision rests implicitly or explicitly on an assess- 
ment of the potential benefits of registration relative to 
the possible costs involved. Proprietors elect to regis- 
ter their businesses when the expected benefits of 
doing so outweigh the expected costs. 
It is useful to distinguish analytically two distinct 
but interrelated costs of registration - the fiscal cost 
and the transactions cost. Fiscal costs include any fees 
that might be required by the registering authorities. In 
Swaziland, a business license ranges from five emalan- 
geni ($1.79) for street vendors to 100 emalangeni 
($35.71) for larger and more capitalized enterprises. In 
Niger, all businesses pay a total of CFA 5,500 ($2 1.23) 
upon registering. Transactions costs include the mone- 
tary costs involved with tiling the application (e.g., 
costs of transport to the capital city) as well as the value 
of the manager’s time which must be spent away from 
her business. As noted above, time costs to the man- 
ager are not generally substantial. No specific informa- 
tion is available on the monetary costs, but applicants 
in Swaziland are expected to pay not only their own 
expenses for the trip to the capital, but also for two 
members of the local chief’s entourage. 
In addition there are the less immediate recurring 
expenses that may ensue from registering. By register- 
ing, enterprises become known to the government, 
which may lead to the imposition of additional taxes or 
regulations at some point in the future. In Swaziland, 
registered businesses pay a 37.5% tax on business 
income. In Niger, the tax system is more complicated, 
with registered enterprises paying the patente. The 
amount levied varies according to the type of enter- 
prise. Joumard, Liedholm and Mead (1992) report that 
the annual tax payments range from CFA 6,500 
($25,09) for tailors to CFA 162,500 ($627.25) for car- 
penters. The average patenle payment seems to be 
about CFA 40,000 ($172.74). This same study also sug- 
gests that the tax burden falls disproportionately on the 
smaller enterprises. This regressive tax structure may 
imply that smaller firms are less likely to register. 
There are, of course, advantages that may accrue to 
enterprises that register. Typically, banks will only 
consider loan applications from officially sanctioned 
businesses. Training programs aimed at the small 
entrepreneur may be disinclined to accept proprietors 
of unregistered firms. Should the enterprise require 
imported inputs, it must gain access to foreign 
exchange. Most allocation systems favor registered 
businesses, and indeed may not consider applications 
from the unregistered. Finally, becoming registered 
permits an enterprise to advertise itself. As noted 
above, however, failing to register does not seem to 
constrain enterprises from expanding. This may imply 
that the benefits from registering are perceived to be 
relatively unimportant. 
5. THE DATA AND KEY VARIABLES 
The data for the analysis were generated by sur- 
veys in Swaziland and Niger, each enumerating 300 
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small enterprises. These enterprises were identified 
from a sample frame established by country-wide sur- 
veys conducted by Michigan State University and 
local institutions.’ The follow-up surveys restricted 
their attention to five previously described subsectors 
in both rural and urban areas. These subsectors were 
chosen in part because they represent a sizeable share 
of small and microenterprise activity in each country, 
but also because they were judged to represent signif- 
icantly different demand patterns.* The follow-up sur- 
veys were conducted in 1992. 
Several key variables loom as candidates for 
explaining the registration decision. First, the sector 
in which the enterprise operates would appear to be an 
important explanatory variable. Certain types of activ- 
ity may be more visible to the authorities, thus making 
the costs of not registering higher than they would be 
otherwise. In addition, the costs of registering, both 
fiscal and transactional, may be higher for some sec- 
tors relative to others. Cloth selling, food selling, 
wood production and metal production were included, 
along with the reference subsector of clothing produc- 
tion. 
Locational aspects represent a second set of char- 
acteristics likely to influence a manager’s assessment 
of the costs and benefits of registering. Enterprises in 
rural areas face higher transactions costs, since they 
must travel to administrative centers to complete the 
licensing process. At the same time, it is likely that it 
is more difficult (and costly) for the government to 
enforce its registration laws in rural areas. In addition, 
the potential advantages of registration, such as the 
ability to advertise, are probably greater for urban 
enterprises. Therefore it is expected that rural entre- 
preneurs will be less likely to register their businesses 
than their urban counterparts. A second locational 
aspect which may be important controls for whether 
the enterprise is home-based. Presumably, enterprises 
operated from the home are less visible to government 
regulators, and therefore the costs of not registering 
are lower for these firms. 
Larger enterprises are usually more visible to the 
government. For such firms the costs of not register- 
ing may become quite high. Moreover, evidence sug- 
gests that the tax system in these countries is regres- 
sive. One would expect, then, that larger enterprises 
would be relatively more likely to register. In addi- 
tion, the benefits of registering may be relatively 
greater for larger firrr~s.~ A variable reflecting whether 
the enterprise has paid employees is used as a proxy 
for size. 
The gender of the proprietor may also have an 
impact on the registration decision. Given the tradi- 
tional role of women regarding childcare, the opportu- 
nity costs of taking the time to go through with the reg- 
istration process may be higher for females than for 
males. As a result, we include in our analysis a vari- 
able controlling for proprietor gender. 
As noted above, it is also necessary to keep in mind 
that some proprietors are largely unaware of the 
requirement to register, and of the potential gains from 
doing so. These proprietors, then, do not make calcu- 
lations along cost-benefit lines. To allow for this sort 
of proprietor, we include variables intended to mea- 
sure the proprietor’s educational attainment or level of 
experience. 
Finally, since it seems likely that the commitment 
to inform proprietors about the benefits of registering 
differs across countries, it is expected that controlling 
for country will be important. A related issue involves 
the relative diligence across countries with which gov- 
ernments pursue enterprises which fail to register. 
Clearly, a lax enforcement structure imposes fewer 
costs on an unregistered enterprise than would a more 
stringent situation. Nigerian firms, operating in a 
country with the tradition of heavy French regulation, 
are hypothesized to be more likely registered than 
those in Swaziland, other things being equal. 
6. THE LOGIT TECHNIQUE 
A natural way to study the determinants of firm 
registration is in a logit regression framework. In the 
logit model, the probability that firm i is registered, Pi, 




1 + exp[-(a + b,x, + &x2 + . . . + bgcJ] 
where the xj are regressors. When this is true, the 
observedlo “log-odds” ratio can be expressed as fol- 
lows: 
ln &,=a+b,r,+bg2+bGn+k, 
where pi is the error term. I I 
The parameters of the coefficients can be esti- 
mated using maximum likelihood procedures. Since 
we are interested, however, not in the change in the 
log-odds ratio but in the change in the probability of 
registration for a unit change in the regressors, we 
must look beyond the coefficients. The partial deriva- 
tive of Pi with respect to X,, 
api exp[-(a + b,x, + . . . + b,,xJ] 
ax,’ [l + exp[-(a + b,x, + . . + b&l]’ 
Pj 
expressed at the mean of the regressor indicates the 
percentage change in the likelihood of registration 
from a unit increase in that variable, holding all other 
variables constant. 
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7. RESULTS 
The results of the logit analysis are summarized in 
Table 1. Most of the key explanatory variables were 
significant and had the hypothesized signs. The partial 
coefficients of the statistically significant variables 
indicate the percentage increase in the likelihood of 
registration, holding the other variables constant. 
Those accustomed to regression analysis will no doubt 
be interested in some measure of “goodness of fit” for 
the logit model. There is in fact an analogue to the 
familiar R-squared measure, the likelihood ratio 
index.r2 This measure will be reported in Table 1. 
Most of the subsector variables, except for selling 
clothes, were significant; enterprises selling food or 
engaged in wood or metal production were less likely 
to be registered than those enterprises producing gar- 
ments. All else constant, a metal firm, for example, 
was 41% less likely to be registered than its counter- 
part in clothing production. 
Location variables also proved to be significant. 
Specifically, village enterprises were 69% less likely 
to be registered than their urban counterparts. There 
was no statistical difference, however, between firms 
located in secondary towns and urban areas. 
Enterprises run inside the home, on the other hand, 
were 42% less likely to be registered than those oper- 
ating outside the home. Apparently, it is easier for 
home-based firms and rural firms to avoid registering. 
Size of firm was also a statistically significant vari- 
able explaining registration. Firms with paid workers, 
for example, were 27% more likely to be registered 
than those lirrns with no such workers. This finding 
may be the result of the regressive tax structure dis- 
cussed above, or it may reflect the fact that larger 
firms find it more difficult to elude the authorities. 
Some entrepreneurial variables also were signili- 
cant, specifically the gender of the entrepreneur. 
Female entrepreneurs were 23% less likely to be reg- 
istered than the male-headed firms, other factors held 
constant. While the reasons for this difference are 
beyond the capabilities of these data, it may be that the 
opportunity costs of registering are higher for women, 
given their traditional household responsibilities. 
The level of education of the entrepreneur, on the 
other hand, was not statistically significant. Given the 
percentage of entrepreneurs in Niger and Swaziland 
who did not register because they were unaware that it 
was required, this result was not expected. 
Finally, one of the most surprising findings is that 
once all other factors were incorporated into the analy- 
sis, the country variable proved to be insignificant. 
Apparently, despite the reportedly more onerous legal 
and regulatory environment in Francophone Niger 
compared with Anglophone Swaziland, such factors 
as the subsector, location, gender of entrepreneur, and 
size of firm were the key determinants of firm regis- 
tration, not country. 
Table 1. Determinants of registration: Logit analysis for 























Home production -1.733 a.42 
(-6.666)s 
Size 
Paid workers 1.118 +0.27 
(3.888)s 
Entrepreneurial characteristics 
Female entrepreneur -0.947 Xl.23 
(-3.123)s 





Likelihood ratio index 0.29 
Source: Survey Data. 
*tStatistics in parentheses. 
tPartial derivative of each independent variable with respect 
to registration evaluated at the mean. 
*Significant at 5% level. 
$Significant at 1% level. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the issue of small firm regis- 
tration using data from surveys conducted in Niger 
and Swaziland. Governments, both at the local and 
national levels are motivated to require registration of 
practically all firms in order to collect revenue or 
enforce health, labor or other regulations. Enterprises 
are motivated to register since certain advantages 
accrue only to the registered. These advantages 
include the ability to obtain credit from banks, to par- 
ticipate in government-sponsored training program, to 
obtain foreign exchange, and to advertise the enter- 
prise. In spite of these reasons, the majority of enter- 
prises in both countries do not register. This is in part 
because certain managers are unaware of the require- 
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ments to register and the advantages of doing so. Other 
managers may consciously avoid registration because 
they feel the expected costs of doing so outweigh the 
likely benefits. For example, being registered does not 
seem to confer any advantages in terms of expansion 
possibilities on enterprises in our sample. 
This paper presents the results of a statistical 
analysis of the factors that determine whether a firm 
will register with the authorities. There are several 
factors that are significant in explaining the probabil- 
ity of registering. First, the sector in which an enter- 
prise operates influences the decision regarding regis- 
tration, with garment producers being the most likely 
to register. Second, firms located in urban areas and 
outside the home are more likely to be registered than 
rural or home-based enterprises. This may be the result 
of a higher degree of visibility to the authorities among 
the former category of firms. Third, larger firms are 
more likely to be registered. Given that the tax struc- 
ture may be regressive, and that it is more difficult for 
larger firms to elude the authorities, this finding is not 
surprising. It is also interesting that female-run enter- 
prises are less likely to be registered even after control- 
ling for size, location and other factors. Fourth, educa- 
tion of the proprietor seems to have no significant 
influence on the registration decision. This is some- 
what surprising since one might expect better educated 
proprietors to be more aware of the benefits of regis- 
tering and the costs involved with failing to do so. 
A final result is of particular interest. Even though 
Niger and Swaziland were reputed to possess differing 
legal and regulatory environments, our analysis indi- 
cates that the probability of a firm registering does not 
depend on which country the firm is located in. It 
seems reasonable to surmise that the bureaucracy is 
not a binding constraint either because of widespread 
lack of knowledge of any benefits of registration, or 
because the benefits are essentially nonexistent. 
Divining the particular reason why country-specific 
effects are insignificant in explaining the probability 
of registering is an intriguing line of research, and one 
that should be pursued in the future. 
This paper provides food for thought for policy 
makers on several issues. First, and somewhat surpris- 
ingly, while registration is required in both countries, 
registration does not appear to have had a deleterious 
effect on compliant enterprises. There is evidence that 
registration does not hinder an enterprise’s growth 
prospects. Furthermore, our research suggests that 
proprietors do not consider the costs of registering 
especially burdensome. 
A second policy consideration involves the prob- 
lem of compliance. How can policy makers increase 
compliance with registration and other related laws? 
One possibility involves the government’s role as 
a disseminator of information. Our research indicates 
that many proprietors fail to register because they 
are unaware that it is required. One possible inter- 
vention by a government might be to find ways to 
make this requirement widely known, and to make 
clear that registration may be beneficial. Our work 
also implies that these benefits are not perceived as 
important by proprietors. To improve the rate of com- 
pliance, the government could make efforts to make 
these benefits more readily available. Such efforts 
might include training programs of various sorts, and 
programs to make credit more accessible to registered 
filNlS. 
A final group of possible interventions to improve 
compliance with registration laws involves decreasing 
the costs of registering or increasing the costs of fail- 
ing to do so. As noted previously, these costs are not 
now perceived as especially high, so the scope of these 
policies may be limited. One possibility might involve 
a rewriting of the tax code to eliminate its regressive 
nature. This could encourage more smaller firms to 
comply. 
Our present research does make clear, however, 
that some characteristics of the firm and its propri- 
etor do influence the likelihood of registration. If 
policy makers are interested in exploring ways to 
increase the rate of compliance with the registration 
laws, it is important that these factors not be over- 
looked. 
NOTES 
1. For example, the complexity .of Niger’s taxation 4. Enterprises producing goods for export, and those pro- 
scheme is detailed in Barlow and Snyder (1993). For a ducing goods not already being made in Swaziland may 
description of Swaziland’s regulations, see Joumard, qualify for a five-year tax holiday after starting the business. 
Liedholm, and Mead (1992). 
5. In Swaziland, women may not work at night, except 
2. The statistics in this section are drawn from Joumard, under very specific circumstances. 
Liedholm and Mead (1992). 
6. Swazi Nation Land is effectively all rural land except 
3. In Swaziland, certain firms are not required to register. that set aside for large-scale commercial agriculture. 
These include farmers who sell their own produce, and man- 
ufacturers producing on order and not operating from a par- 7. These surveys were conducted in 1989 in Niger and in 
titular store (e.g., upholsterers). ln Niger, registration is 1991 in Swaziland. For details see Fisseha (1990) and 
mandatory for all enterprises. Fisseha and McPherson (1991). 
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8. See Joumard, Liedholm, and Mead (1992) for details ll[n,P,(l - PJ], where n; is the sample size. 
of the follow-up surveys. 
12. The likelihood ratio index is calculated as follows: 
9. Larger firms, for example, are more likely to use 
greater amounts of imported raw materials and to borrow lnL(R) 
from formal financial institutions (see Liedholm and Mead, p2=-l- 
1987). Id(o) 
10. It is assumed that the true and observed proportions are where the numerator of the expression is the value of the log- 
related by pt = P, + e,, where e, is a random disturbance. likelihood function from the logit regression, and the denom- 
inator is the value of the likelihood function when the effects 
Il. j.~ has the following properties: E(p) = 0, Var (u) = of all regressors are constrained to be zero. 
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